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Abstract
It is generally considered that more competition might help curb
corruption, as rents, which motivate corrupt agreements, are decreas-
ing in the degree of competition. This paper proposes a framework
to analyze the relationship between corruption and competition. It
studies the optimal incentive scheme for potentially corrupt oﬃcials in
charge of inspecting firms that compete in the product market. Given
that bribe-taking is sometimes tolerated in equilibrium, for specific
values of the externality that motivated regulatory intervention, non-
monotonic eﬀects arise and more competition may lead to an increase
in corruption. Moreover, it is shown that in this context competi-
tion is always welfare improving, even though it might lead to more
corruption.
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Building, 50 George Square, Edinburgh EH8 9JY, UK. E-mail: stephane.straub@ed.ac.uk.
1
“The role of competitive pressures in preventing corruption may be an
important aspect of a strategy to deter bribery of low-level oﬃcials, but
requires a broad based exploration of the impact of both organizational and
market structure on the incentives for corruption facing both bureaucrats
and their clients.” Susan Rose-Ackerman (1998).
1 Introduction
Following the emergence of corruption as a central topic of the international
policy debate in the 90s, the economic understanding of the mechanisms of
corruption has made important progress, both at the theoretical and em-
pirical level1. In the search for eﬀective policy recommendations in the fight
against corruption2, it has been suggested that making markets more compet-
itive may reduce corrupt behavior by reducing the available rents. A complete
appraisal of the eﬀects of such a policy, however, needs to take into account
the complex incentive issues raised by the changes in both the organization
of markets and their regulation, as pointed out in Susan Rose-Ackerman’s
quote above3. While greater competition and thus smaller rents may make
bribe-taking less interesting for bureaucrats, the incentives given to them to
reduce the temptation of corruption may also change in the process. With
less rents to grab, but more firms potentially subject to bribery and a diﬀer-
ent level of tolerance toward corrupt transactions, it is unclear whether the
frequency and the aggregate amount of bribes will increase or decrease.
This paper’s main contribution is to provide a theoretical framework that
accounts for the eﬀect of competition on the contractual incentive scheme of
bureaucrats in charge of an industry regulation. In doing so, it introduces
endogenous corruption, based on informational foundations, in an industrial
organization model where firms compete in the product market. The way
politicians and higher levels of the bureaucracy define the rules that govern
the interaction between private agents and lower levels bureaucrats then de-
pends on the prevailing level of competition and the likelihood of corruption.
In a nutshell, we consider a situation in which there is regulatory inter-
1See Bardhan (1997) and Aidt (2003) for surveys on corruption economics.
2See for example Klitgaard (1988), Rose-Ackerman (1999), World Bank (2002), and
the references herein.
3A related point was also made in the rent-seeking literature (Krueger 1974, Bhagwati
1982).
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vention to correct a negative externality linked to the production process.
The need to rely on inspectors to discover the type of technology used by
firms implies that better informed agents may enter in side agreements with
these firms to hide the results of their inspection in exchange for a bribe.
When there is heterogeneity of inspectors with respect to their honesty, the
optimal choice is between no inspections at all, inspections and tolerance of
some corruption, or inspections and no corruption.
There are widespread examples of such situations. To mention only a few,
Rose-Ackerman (1999) reviews numerous references documenting bribery of
inspectors in construction projects to reduce costs by violating safety rules
and construction standards in Korea, Turkey, Russia and New York City.
Other cases she mentions include systematic bribery to secure a favorable
business climate by bending regulations, for example in the forestry industry
and other natural resources, and payments to relax the implementation of
environmental rules in Pakistan. Similar stories can be found in Klitgaard
(1988).
The model generates a number of important conclusions. Looking at the
range of values of the externality in which corruption is allowed to happen,
two main points emerge. First, the avoidance of corruption may come at the
cost of accepting market failure. In other words, over a range of parameters,
corruption becomes less prevalent because the regulatory intervention that
gave rise to it has become uneconomical and is dropped altogether. Second,
and more importantly, for given values of the externality, non-monotonic
eﬀects arise, implying that in specific environments, more competition can
either lead to an increase or a decrease in corruption. Finally, we also show
that increased competition always enhances welfare when production exter-
nalities and potential corruption form part of the environment, even when
this implies an increase in corruption. The main insights of the model hold
both in the context of Cournot and Bertrand competition.
Our model first draws on the literature starting with Laﬀont and Tirole
(1991) and Tirole (1992) that models corruption in the information-based
setting of the principal-agent model, by introducing an intermediate super-
visor in charge of reducing the uncertainty on behalf of the principal. A
common tool of these models is to assume that bureaucrats vary in terms of
their honesty or their fear to be caught, in order to obtain corruption in equi-
librium. As mentioned above, we adapt this methodology to an industrial
organization environment.
Specific theoretical contributions on the topic of corruption and compe-
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tition include Bliss and Di Tella (1997) and Laﬀont and N’Guessan (1999).
Bliss and Di Tella (1997) propose a model of extortion, in which the level of
bribes, set unilaterally by graft-maximizing bureaucrats, forces some firms
out of the market. They show in this setting that an increase in parameters
of an exogenously given level of “deep competition” (lower overhead costs or
more competition for the market) has an ambiguous eﬀect on equilibrium
corruption, measured by the size of individual bribes. The main diﬀerence
with our model is that while they take bribing power as exogenously given
(not based on informational foundations) and thereby make the number of
firms a choice variable of bureaucrats, we endogenize the corruption game
and vary the number of firms exogenously.
Emerson (2005), embeds Bliss and Di Tella’s framework in a model in
which firms chose between being bribed or pertaining to an informal com-
peting fringe. His model gives rise to multiple equilibria, with competition
and corruption being negatively correlated, but does not endogenize corrup-
tion, relying instead on an exogenous detection function of corrupt oﬃcials.
Laﬀont and N’Guessan (1999) use a three-tiers hierarchy in an asymmet-
ric regulation model where the stake for corruption is endogenous. There,
uncertainty on the honesty of the bureaucrat in charge of reducing the in-
formation asymmetry between the firm and the regulator implies that some
corruption may be tolerated in equilibrium. They study the eﬀect of more
competition at the supervision level, and more competition in the compet-
itive sector producing goods that are complements or substitutes for the
regulated sector goods. In both cases, they show that more competition may
increase corruption, and that it also increases welfare. The limitation of this
framework is that it studies the incentives for corruption in the context of the
regulation of a unique, monopolistic firm, while competition only enters the
picture indirectly by aﬀecting the regulatory scheme between the principal
and the monopoly.
Finally, our model also builds on Acemoglu and Verdier (1999), who an-
alyze the trade-oﬀ between market failure and government intervention, and
show that when bureaucrats are heterogeneous both intervention with no
corruption and intervention with some corruption prevail only over certain
ranges of parameters. However, their framework does not allow for market
competition.
At the empirical level, Ades and Di Tella (1999) provide cross-country ev-
idence that some aggregate measures of competition, like openness, industrial
concentration or eﬀectiveness of antitrust regulations, indeed correspond to
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lower levels of perceived corruption, as captured by subjective indices pub-
lished by The Economist Intelligence Unit or the World Competitiveness
Report. Carrying out similar estimations in a sample of African countries,
Laﬀont and N’Guessan (1999) show, however, the existence of non-monotonic
eﬀects, with the openness eﬀect becoming negative in the case of the less cor-
rupt countries. Ades and Di Tella (1997) find a positive relationship between
more active industrial policy, considered to temporarily shelter chosen firms
or sectors from competition, and corruption. Finally, Troesken (2003) docu-
ments the US historical experience in three diﬀerent industrial sectors (public
utilities, oil refining and whiskey distilling), and argues that corruption has
been less prevalent in more competitive environments.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the
assumptions on the production technology, the structure of the market and
the nature of the regulatory intervention that eventually gives rise to corrup-
tion. Section 3 presents the results in the context of Cournot competition.
Section 4 analyzes the evolution of welfare. Section 5 discusses Bertrand
competition, and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Market Structure
Consider the market for an homogenous good, in which aggregate demand
is given by the inverse demand function p (Q), which is common knowledge
to all market participants as well as the government, and is assumed to be
concave, continuous and have continuous first and second derivatives.
The good is supplied by n profit-maximizing firms, indexed by i = 1, .., n,
so that Q =
nP
qi
i=1
. Firms are assumed symmetric, i.e. they have access to
the same technology.
Firms compete à la Cournot4. Before looking at the equilibrium in this
market, we characterize the technology available to the firms.
4We present the case of Cournot competition in the main part of the paper and discuss
the case of Bertrand competition in Section 5.
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2.2 Production Technology
Each firm can either use a “good” technology, with cost c (q), or a “bad” one,
with a cost c (q). The functions c (.) and c (.) are convex and have continuous
first and second derivatives. We assume that the bad technology has a lower
cost over all the range of potential output, i.e. c (q) < c (q), for all q ≤ qM ,
where qM denotes the monopoly output in this market for the cost function
c (.). We define the function ∆c (q) ≡ c (q)− c (q).
When using the cheaper technology, the firm generates as a by-product a
negative non-pecuniary externality to consumers, parametrized by the func-
tion x(q), with x0 > 0, x00 ≥ 0. For now, we simply consider the case of
a linear externality, x (q) = xq and discuss later the case of x (q) strictly
convex.
We can think for example of the bad technology as one that generates
air or water pollution, while the good technology is a cleaner, environment-
friendly, production process that avoids contamination but is more expensive.
When presenting analytical results, the computations are done using
generic demand and cost functions, for which the main results are shown
to hold. However, graphic illustrations require the use of specific functional
forms for costs. Unless specified otherwise, in these cases we consider the cost
function with the bad technology given by c(q) = 0, and the good technology
entailing costs c(q) = βq, β > 0, so that ∆c (q) = βq.
2.3 Market Equilibrium
Assume first that only the good technology, characterized by the cost function
c (q), is available. In this Cournot setting, all firms, being symmetrical in
cost, choose the same production level in equilibrium, which we denote by
qGn , where the subscript n indicates the number of firms active in the market.
Aggregate production is QGn = nq
G
n , and the price is given by p
G
n = p
¡
QGn
¢
.
Finally, the profit of any individual firm is given by ΠGn = p(QGn ).qGn − c
¡
qGn
¢
.
Similarly, if only the bad technology were available, individual output,
aggregate output, price and individual profit, would be qBn , Q
B
n = nq
B
n , p
B
n =
p
¡
QBn
¢
and ΠBn = p(QBn ).qBn − c
¡
qBn
¢
respectively.
When both technologies are available, and in the absence of a regulatory
constraint, it is a strictly dominant strategy for any individual firm to use
the bad technology, so the relevant equilibrium is the one in which all firms
use the bad technology and produce qBn .
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2.4 Welfare
Denoting by CS (Qn) the consumer surplus when aggregate production isQn,
social welfare, computed as the sum of consumer surplus and firms’ profits,
is:
W in = CS
¡
Qin
¢
+ nΠin − I[ci(.)=c(.)]xQin, i = G,B, (1)
where I is the indicator function taking value 1 whenever the statement in
brackets is true, i.e. the “bad” technology is in use, and 0 otherwise, so
the third term on the right hand side is the eﬀect of the externality. Com-
paring the two equilibria introduced above opens a rationale for regulatory
intervention, as the welfare gain from preventing the externality might ex-
ceed the additional aggregate cost to the producers of the good. Consider a
benevolent government, maximizing welfare. If WBn > W
G
n , social welfare is
higher when the bad rather than the good technology is used, meaning that
the increase in firms’ profits exceeds the externality cost. Then, no interven-
tion is necessary as producers select the bad technology willingly. However,
if WGn > W
B
n , regulatory intervention inducing firms to switch to the good
technology can be socially eﬃcient5.
We now turn to discuss how regulatory intervention can enforce such a
shift, and introduce the possibility of corruption.
2.5 Inspection Technology and the Scope for Corrup-
tion
It is realistic to assume that technology is not directly observable by the
government, which needs to send inspectors to visit the firms and discover
the production technique they are using6.
Instead, the government only observes the price, from which quantity can
be inferred. In this context, when observing a price p diﬀerent from pGn , the
government knows for sure that (some of) the firms have been using the bad
technology. Such an observation can then trigger a fine, which has to be high
5We assume that transaction costs make a contract between consumers and producers
impossible, so allocation of property rights over the good aﬀected by the externality is not
a solution.
6Especially since in reality there might be many diﬀerent production techniques with
diﬀering costs.
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enough to prevent firms from using the bad technology.7
Such a mechanism, however, does not insure that firms will shift to the
good technology. Given the threat to be fined, firms still have the possibility
to keep on using the bad technology while aligning their production level
to qGn . As all firms are identical, this becomes the new equilibrium. Firms
produce qGn and use the bad technology, so the profit of any individual firm
is given by:
ΠBn (qGn ) = p(QGn ).qGn − c
¡
qGn
¢
. (2)
Social welfare becomes WBn
¡
QGn
¢
instead of WBn . Then, it could be that
WBn
¡
QGn
¢
> WGn , in which case no further step is taken. Alternatively, we
might have WGn > W
B
n
¡
QGn
¢
, and the government proceeds as in the main
text below. In this last case, whetherWBn > W
B
n
¡
QGn
¢
orWBn < W
B
n
¡
QGn
¢
is
immaterial, as the mechanism is always used along with inspections8. Note
that, in the absence of explicit collusion between the firms allowing for com-
pensating output deviations, no individual firm has an incentive to deviate,
as this would trigger a fine (on itself as well as possibly on other firms) that
would make it worse oﬀ. Compared to the equilibrium with the good tech-
nology, each firm now makes an additional profit, which we denote by s. The
parameter s is the stake of dishonest behavior, which further on will also rep-
resent the stake of corruption9. Note that s = ΠBn (qGn )−ΠGn
¡
qGn
¢
= ∆c
¡
qGn
¢
.
To make sure that the good technology is used, a regime of inspection
must therefore be put in place. Inspectors visit the firms and make a report
on their technology. When an inspector reveals the use of the bad technology,
a fine, considered to be equal to total profit ΠGn + s, is imposed on the firm.
For simplicity, we assume that each firm is visited by a diﬀerent inspector.
7It must be at least equal to the gain from cheating. We assume for simplicity that
the government imposes the largest possible fine, which amounts to ban the firms from
participating in the market and confiscate all its assets subject to a limited liability con-
straint. Such a constraint rules out infinite fines that would solve the problem for a very
small probability of being caught. More complex mechanisms can be devised, for exam-
ple allowing for a subsidy linked to the use of the good technology. This would multiply
opportunities for corruption without aﬀecting the main intuitions.
8Doing away with the use of the mechanism altogether would not change substantially
any of the results, at the cost of analytical complications.
9Alternatively, we could consider that the stake is the full profit ΠBn (qGn ). This would
not alter the main results but would require additional assumptions on the bargaining
power of the firm and the corrupt inspectors below.
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However, as inspectors generate information not directly verifiable by
the highest level of their hierarchy, they may be tempted to improve their
material condition by making a side deal with the firms their are visiting. If
collusion indeed occurs, the inspector allows the firm to keep on using the
bad technology, in exchange for a share10 α of the stake s.
It is a well known artifact of information-based corruption models that
getting corruption in equilibrium entails having heterogeneous inspectors11.
We assume that inspectors are of two types. A proportion γ is less corrupt,
or more afraid of being caught, while a proportion 1 − γ is more corrupt.
Following the by-now standard assumption in the literature on regulatory
capture that there is a deadweight loss of corruption, linked to the fact that
side transfers may be ineﬃcient or diﬃcult, as well as to psychological aspects
of the agents involved in corruption, like their relative honesty or fear to get
discovered (See Laﬀont and Tirole, 1991, for a discussion on this aspect and
the broader notion of enforceable side contracts), we consider that when the
firm gives s, the inspector receives only ks. Less corrupt inspectors have
strictly positive transaction costs (k < 1), while the more corrupt ones have
lower transaction costs, which we normalize to 0 (thus k = 1). Figure 1
shows the probability and type of inspection.
10In what follows, we assume for simplicity that α = 1. This does not change any of the
following results.
11This was anticipated in Tirole (1992) and illustrated for example by Acemoglu and
Verdier (1999) and Laﬀont and N’Guessan (1999).
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1-π
γ
1- γ
Inspections by a
less corrupt agent
(k < 1)
No inspections
π
Inspections by a
more corrupt agent
(k = 1)
Choice of
technology
Figure 1
When inspectors are corruptible, the alternative is between giving them
incentive payments to ensure their truthful reporting, or not using them at
all. We model the reward r given to inspectors assuming that they have a
non-zero probability ξ of getting caught if they enter a corrupt deal with the
firm12. Then, considering that inspectors are protected by limited liability
and get an income of zero when caught, the reward must satisfy:
r ≥ (1− ξ)
³eks+ r´⇔ r ≥ 1− ξ
ξ
eks, (3)
where ek ∈ {k, 1}. To simplify notations, we call ν ≡ 1−ξξ , where ν can
be interpreted as a risk parameter reducing the return from bribes13, and
dν
dξ < 0. As we will see when discussing the results, the government will have
to decide whether it sets the reward at the level where all inspectors would
behave honestly (r = νs), or alternatively at the level where only the more
honest inspectors do so (r = νks).
12This methodology is similar to Besley and McLaren (1993) and Mookherjee and Png
(1995) among others.
13We keep ν distinct from k, as it captures diﬀerent aspects of the corrupt environ-
ment. k relates to individual traits of agents, whereas ν denotes societal eﬀorts to uncover
corruption. This avoids the need for diﬀerent probability of inspectors getting caught,
focusing rather on heterogeneity along k.
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Note that the total cost of monitoring depends on the stake of corruption
(the sum of firms’ extra profits). Although it increases in the number of
firms, a countervailing eﬀect arises because it is also linked to the amount of
profit made by each firm, which is decreasing in n.
In a context with heterogeneous inspectors, inducing the use of the good
technology requires that the probability of facing an inspection exceeds some
threshold π∗. If r = νs, a cheating firm knows it will face tough inspections
with probability π∗ and get 0, while it secures an extra profit with probability
1− π∗. The minimum level of inspection necessary is then given by:
(1− π∗)
¡
ΠGn + s
¢
= ΠGn
⇔ π∗ = sΠGn + s
(4)
When inspectors are honest and report truthfully their findings, it suﬃces
to inspect nπ∗ firms14 to make a firm’s expected profit higher when it uses
the good technology.
If the government chooses the lower reward r = νks, when meeting a
more corrupt inspector (probability (1− γ)π) the firm makes a side deal,
the extra profit realized s is taken away by the corrupt inspector, and cor-
ruption is uncovered with probability ξ. Thus, the firm gets away with ΠGn
with probability (1− γ)π∗∗ (1− ξ). The probability of inspections needed to
enforce good behavior becomes:
(1− π∗∗)
¡
ΠGn + s
¢
+ (1− γ)π∗∗ (1− ξ)ΠGn = ΠGn
⇔ π∗∗ = s
(γ + ξ(1− γ))ΠGn + s
. (5)
As the probability to meet a relatively honest inspector decreases, we
obviously get that more inspections must be carried out (π∗∗ > π∗).
Lastly, it is worth discussing how actual cheating and corruption occur in
the model. As explained in the timing section below, corrupt inspectors send
a signal previous to their visit to firms, so these know if they are going to face
14Or the natural number immediately above it, as nπ∗ might not be a round value. In
what follows, we treat n as continuous.
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a corrupt demand when choosing their technology15. Although our model is
static, this can be thought of as a shortcut for a model in which there is
repeated interaction between firms and inspectors, who develop a reputation
for being corrupt. Examples of such relationship abound. Schlosser (2002),
in his fascinating account of the American fast food industry, relates that, in
the 90s, slaughterhouses regularly infringing safety and hygiene regulations
were often informed in advance about visits from USDA inspectors. Rose-
Ackerman (1999, p18-19) characterizes corrupt relationships as repeated in-
teractions and mentions the importance of connections between firms and
government oﬃcials in cases of bribery oriented to avoid costly regulations in
Indonesia and Pakistan (over the implementation of environmental rules), as
well as in Mexico and Kenya (regarding the award of permits and licenses).
Klitgaard (1988) reports examples from Philippines and Singapore, where
inspectors are subject to frequent geographical and functional rotation to
break possible corrupt relationships with the agents they supervise.
2.6 Timing
Finally, before turning to the analysis, let us recapitulate the timing of events.
1. The government announces the regulatory mechanism (price mecha-
nism, fines) and the details of the inspection regime (intensity π, tasks and
rewards r to inspectors).
2. If the reward is not set high enough to induce honest behavior by the
more corrupt inspectors, these send a signal to the firm they are going to
inspect, indicating their willingness to enter in a side agreement.
3. Firms decide on their production technique (the good technology or
the bad one) and their production level.
4. The government observes the price. Inspections take place. Side-
contracts, if any, are realized.
5. Inspectors entering corrupt deals, if any, are caught with probability
ξ. Rewards are paid. Fines are imposed on firms if required.
15This modeling option is chosen for simplicity. Alternatively, one can think of firms
randomizing between the good and the bad technologies, since they get the same payoﬀ
from each of them, as in Acemoglu and Verdier (1999). In this mixed strategy equilibrium,
they would chose the bad technology with probability (1− γ)π∗, which is also the prob-
ability to face an inspector asking for a bribe. It can be shown that such an equilibrium
is immune to small deviations by the government (increasing the probability of inspection
π∗∗ by a tiny amount ε), as long as ξ < π∗∗.
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We now consider the optimal decision from the point of view of a welfare
maximizing government, in terms of having inspections or not and allowing
or not corruption, and analyze how this pattern is aﬀected by changes in the
level of competition.
3 Analysis: Pattern of Government Interven-
tion
Three possibilities arise. First, the government may choose to make high
enough incentive payments, so all inspectors behave honestly. This entails
paying them at least νs. Social welfare is then given by:
WNC = CS(QGn ) + nΠGn − nπ∗λνs, (6)
where the subscript NC stands for “No Corruption”, and the last term on
the right hand side represents the incentive payment to the nπ∗ inspectors,
with λ parametrizing the cost of public funds. This expression assumes that
although such payments are only transfers from one class of agents to another
and do not reduce welfare per se, they are costly because they involve the
need to raise distortionary taxes, i.e. paying an inspector r costs society λr
in net terms.
However, this solution involves some waste of incentive payments, as a
fraction γ of inspectors could be made honest with smaller payments, equal
to νks. A second solution is thus to stick to this lower level of payments, and
let a fraction (1− γ) of inspectors be bribed. Then, (1− γ)π∗∗n inspectors
ask for a bribe and this is also the number of firms cheating and using the
bad technology to produce qGn , while γnπ
∗∗ inspectors remain honest.
This yields a level of social welfare equal to:
WPC = CS(QGn ) + (1− γ)π∗∗n
¡
ΠGn + s
¢
+ (1− (1− γ)π∗∗)nΠGn (7)
−x (1− γ)π∗∗QGn − (γ + (1− γ) (1− ξ))nπ∗∗λνks,
where PC stands for “Partial Corruption”. Note that the second term on the
right hand side, is equal to the profit made by firms getting away with the
use of the bad technology (equal, for each of them, to ΠGn +s), which part s is
transferred to the corrupt inspectors with k = 1. As this is a simple transfer
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between agents, it still enters social welfare16. As for the last term on the
right hand side, corresponding to the incentive payment given to inspectors,
it is multiplied by γ+(1−γ) (1− ξ) ≡ τ , because it is paid both to the more
honest inspectors and to the more corrupt ones that are not caught.
Finally, if no inspectors are used, social welfare is simply:
WNI = CS
¡
QGn
¢
+ n
¡
ΠGn + s
¢
− xQGn , (8)
Comparing WNC , WPC , and WNI , it now can be shown that there are
three thresholds defined by the following equations (all proofs are in the
Appendix):
• WPC > WNI .
Comparing expressions (7) and (8), this is the case if:
x >
∆c
¡
qGn
¢
qGn
(1 +
τπ∗∗λνk
1− (1− γ)π∗∗ ) ≡ x
∗. (9)
• WNC > WNI .
Combining (6) and (8):
x >
∆c
¡
qGn
¢
qGn
(1 + π∗λν) ≡ x∗∗. (10)
• WNC > WPC .
From (6) and (7), this is the case in the parameters region defined by:
x >
∆c
¡
qGn
¢
qGn
(1 +
λν
¡ π∗
π∗∗ − τk
¢
(1− γ) ) ≡ x
∗∗∗. (11)
As proved in the Appendix, two situations may arise. In the first one,
in which the probability ξ to catch an inspector incurring in corruption is
low enough, the ordering is x∗∗∗ < x∗∗ < x∗. Then, only two regimes prevail
and there are either no inspections at all, or inspections with full incentive
16It is possible to allow for a lower government’s valuation of corrupt agents’ welfare.
We show below that the main analysis and conclusions are unaltered.
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payments and no corruption. As the probability of detecting bribery is low,
it is more costly to tolerate it and partial corruption never happens.
Alternatively, when the probability ξ to catch an inspector incurring in
corruption becomes high enough, we get the ordering x∗ < x∗∗ < x∗∗∗, and
there are three regions of parameters, where the following regimes prevail
respectively: no inspection (NI), inspections and partial corruption (PC),
and inspections and no corruption (NC). Partial corruption prevails in the
range [x∗, x∗∗∗], while there are no inspections for x < x∗ and there are
inspections with no corruption for x > x∗∗∗. As society becomes more eﬃcient
at detecting corruption, it is less costly and can be tolerated more often. This
first result is summarized in the following proposition 1.
Proposition 1 There is a threshold ξ∗ (n) ≡ k−γ
1−γ
ΠGn+s
(1+k)ΠGn+ks
such that, for
ξ > ξ∗, x∗ < x∗∗ < x∗∗∗, and there is no intervention (NI) for x ≤ x∗,
intervention with tolerance for partial corruption (PC) for x∗ < x < x∗∗∗,
and intervention with no tolerance for corruption (NC) for x∗∗∗ ≤ x. When
ξ ≤ ξ∗, x∗∗∗ < x∗∗ < x∗ and only two regimes exist: no intervention (NI) for
x ≤ x∗∗, and intervention with no tolerance for corruption (NC) for x∗∗ < x.
Moreover, ∂ξ
∗
∂n > 0, and ξ
∗ (n) is bounded below by ξ∗ (1) = k−γ
1−γ
ΠG1 +s
(1+k)ΠG1 +ks
and above by ξ∗ (∞) = k−γk(1−γ) .
For practical purposes, corollary 2 distinguishes three cases derived from
proposition 1.
Corollary 2 Case 1: If ξ < ξ∗ (1), x∗∗∗ < x∗∗ < x∗ whatever n and only the
two regimes NI and NC prevail.
Case 2: If ξ∗ (1) < ξ < ξ∗ (∞) , partial corruption exists for low values of n,
but there is a threshold above which it disappears.
Case 3: Finally, if ξ > ξ∗ (∞), x∗ < x∗∗ < x∗∗∗ whatever n, and partial
corruption always exist.
Since we are interested in the comparative statics on corruption, in the
rest of this section we focus on the last of these cases, in which corruption
actually occurs17. Similar results hold for the intermediate case in which
partial corruption exists for n low enough, as discussed below. Intuitively,
17Graphical representations for cases 1 and 2 are given in the Appendix.
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inspections are used when the burden of the externality becomes higher than
the sum of the additional cost imposed on producers to eliminate it and the
cost of incentive payments meant to ensure that inspectors behave honestly.
Moreover, if a fraction of the inspectors is more corrupt and requires higher
incentive payments to prevent bribery, there is a range over which the net
gain resulting from the complete elimination of the externality is lower than
the waste of incentive payments linked to the fact that the more honest
inspectors could have been made to report truthfully with a lower reward.
In this range, partial corruption dominates.
Looking at the range of parameters in which corruption is allowed to
happen, we see that the comparative statics will depend crucially on the
behavior of π∗ and π∗∗.
Figure 2 shows the shape of the diﬀerent regions and the main compara-
tive statics, first in the space (x, β) for n fixed, then in the space (x, n) for
β fixed, using the diﬀerential cost function ∆c (q) = βq. It is easy to see
(see Appendix) that all the thresholds x∗, x∗∗ and x∗∗∗, as well as π
∗
π∗∗ , are
increasing in n, the number of firms active in the market.
In panel (a), the region between the curves for x∗ and x∗∗∗ is characterized
by partial corruption. The dotted curve in between corresponds to x∗∗.
The small arrows show that these curves rotate downwards when n in-
creases. As this happens, the region in which corruption prevails is shrinking.
For a given value of β, this is illustrated in panel (b).
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Figure 2
The important lessons from Figure 2 are the following18.
First, corruption does not always fade away in the limit, as shown by the
fact that the asymptotes for x∗ and x∗∗∗ are diﬀerent. For very high values
of n, there is a range, in terms of x, in which corruption happens. Indeed,
as firms coordinate on the good technology output qGn while using the bad
technology, rents subside even with perfect competition.
18Applying a lower weight to corrupt agents’ gains in the welfare function would simply
shift the curves for x∗, x∗∗, and x∗∗∗ to the left and shrink the PC region. The rest of the
analysis would be unchanged.
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Second, as n increases, regulatory intervention becomes undesirable for
higher values of the externality x, leaving a wider region in which the market
failure is tolerated. This is because, as there are more firms to inspect, there
is an increase in the threshold, in terms of x, above which the sum of the
additional cost imposed on producers to eliminate the externality and the
cost of incentive payments meant to ensure that inspectors behave honestly
exceeds the burden of the externality. In other words, the larger the number
of firms, the higher the value of the unitary externality above which it is
socially eﬃcient to have inspections.
Finally and more importantly, note that although at first sight Figure 2
gives support to the intuition according to which, as competition increases
and rents become smaller, corruption is eventually less prevalent, this in
fact has little meaning. Indeed, it is only verified in a “statistical” sense,
i.e. if one considers the region in which corruption is allowed to happen
as the size of the externality x varies. In fact, the relevant x motivating a
regulatory intervention is likely to be a constant given by the characteristics
of the environment. Then, considering a specific value of the externality,
non-monotonic results might prevail, as shown in the next section, and an
increase in competition might well result in more corruption.
3.1 Does more Competition Imply more or less Cor-
ruption?
In Figure 3, we consider the specific unitary externality x1 from Figure 2 and
show the path for the value of the expected aggregate amount of bribes in
the industry as n grows. As n exceeds n1, there is a discontinuity, since we
drop out of the partial corruption regime.
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Figure 3: Comparative statics on bribes
In this case, the intuition is that, as n grows, intervention becomes too
costly (remember that π∗∗ grows) so inspections are dropped completely.
Although this fits the intuitive account in which a high enough degree of
competition eventually kills corruption, the actual mechanism behind it is
more complex than a simple reference to the size of the stakes available for
side contracts. Indeed, the shift is from a regime in which regulatory control
entails the tolerance of some corruption, to another one in which a socially
costly externality is left unchecked.
Moreover, these conclusions might be completely reversed for diﬀerent
values of x as shown in Figure 4 below19.
19The shape of the portion of the curve above n2 is linked to the comparative statics on
the size of bribes (see Appendix) and is due to the specific cost function used. A diﬀerent
cost specification would still give rise to the jump at n2, but the total expected amount of
bribes might be decreasing thereafter.
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Figure 4: Comparative statics on bribes
Now, for an externality with a higher unitary cost, such as x2, there is no
corruption initially, and the jump to a regime in which corruption actually
happens when the number of firms increases.
As more inspections are needed (both n and π
∗
π∗∗ increase), the additional
cost of incentive payments meant to ensure that inspectors behave honestly
increases. The sum of these payments and of the cost born by firms im-
plementing the good technology now exceeds the burden of the externality,
so that it becomes socially eﬃcient to shift from inspections with high in-
centive payments, to a regime with lower incentive payments and partial
corruption20.
Proposition 3 summarizes the results so far.
Proposition 3 With a benevolent government choosing the optimal regula-
tory regime, and depending on the level of the externality, diﬀerent dynamics
emerge with respect to corruption when n, the number of firms in the mar-
kets, grows.
- For x ≤ x∗n=1, there is no intervention (NI) and thus no corruption, what-
ever n.
- For x∗n=1 ≤ x ≤ x∗∗∗n=1, there is a threshold n0 such that when n becomes
bigger than n0, there is a shift from intervention with tolerance for partial
20If x2 is to the left of the asymptote for x∗, for some higher value of n it may even
become better from a welfare point of view to scrap inspections altogether, and corruption
again disappears, although we are now in a completely diﬀerent regime since there are no
inspections.
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corruption (PC) to no intervention (NI).
- For x∗∗∗n=1 ≤ x ≤ β(1 + τγλνk), there are two thresholds n00 and n000 such
that when n becomes bigger than n00, there is a shift from intervention with
no tolerance for corruption (NC) to intervention with tolerance for partial
corruption (PC), and when n becomes bigger than n000, there is a shift from
intervention with tolerance for partial corruption (PC) to no intervention
(NI).
- For β(1 + λνk) ≤ x ≤ β(1 + λν(1−τk)
1−γ ), there is a threshold n
0000 such that
when n becomes bigger than n0000, there is a shift from intervention with no
tolerance for corruption (NC) to intervention with tolerance for partial cor-
ruption (PC).
- Finally, for x ≥ β(1 + λν(1−τk)
1−γ ), there is intervention with no tolerance for
corruption (NC) and thus no corruption, whatever n.
Note that in the intermediate case of corollary 2, in which the partial
corruption region disappears when n crosses a certain threshold, the sequence
described in proposition 3 is unchanged, except for the fourth bullet point
that now features a transition from intervention with no corruption (NC) to
no intervention (NI). The two cases illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 remain
valid.
The conclusion of this section is that, depending on the type of market
failure that government intervention intends to correct, very diﬀerent pat-
terns may emerge, from the case where corruption is reduced by increased
competition, to the polar situation in which more competition can actually
generate more corrupt transactions between agents.
4 Isowelfare curves
To complete the previous analysis, we now look at the evolution of welfare
in the diﬀerent regimes as parameters values for the number of firms and the
impact of the externality vary. Figure 5 presents the map of isowelfare curves
in the space (x, n).
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Figure 5: Isowelfare curves
The derivation of the shape of the isowelfare curves in each region and
the way they connect can be summarized in the following intuitive way.
First, considering that in region NI, welfare is given by WNI = CS
¡
QGn
¢
+
n
¡
ΠGn + s
¢
− xQGn , it is easy to see that along the vertical axis (for x = 0),
welfare is increasing in n. For strictly positive values of x, and n constant,
since the consumer surplus and profit terms are independent of x, it is also
obvious that WNI(n, x) > WNIn (n, x + ε), where W
NI(n, x) is the welfare
function evaluated at the values n and x. Therefore at any interior point
in regime NI, moving horizontally and to the right must lead to a lower
isowelfare curve. This justifies the increasing shape of the curves in this
region21, as well as the fact that a move upwards implies a shift to a curve
denoting a higher level of welfare, as indicated by the small arrows in the
graph.
Looking now at the NC region on the right part of the graph, welfare is
given byWNC = CS(QGn )+nΠGn−nπ∗λνs. As this expression is independent
of x, it follows that for given n welfare is constant and the isowelfare curves
are horizontal as depicted in Figure 5.
Moreover, by definition, along the frontier locus for x∗∗, we have WNI =
WNC , so the curves must connect at the frontier and we also deduct that,
by continuity, welfare is increasing as we move upwards in the NC region.
21The concavity can be readily derived by looking at the second derivative of the welfare
function.
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Finally, a similar argument shows that isowelfare curves in the intermedi-
ate PC region must connect along the x∗ locus with those of the NI region,
and along the x∗∗∗ locus with those of the NC region. Again, a continuity
argument leads to welfare being increasing as one moves upwards.
This welfare ordering thus shows that for a given level of externality,
and whatever the regime we are in, increasing competition is always wel-
fare improving. This holds true even considering that such an increase in
competition may lead to more corruption, as shown for example in Figure 4.
Finally, note that the same welfare comparisons hold in the case where
the intermediate PC regime disappears.
This discussion is summarized in the following proposition 4.
Proposition 4 An increase in the number of firms active in the market is
always welfare improving, even if it leads to a jump to a regime with increased
tolerance for corruption.
5 Bertrand Competition
Assume now that firms compete à la Bertrand and that total output is shared
equally between the firms in the market. Then, ΠGn = 0, and π∗ = π∗∗ = 1.
The main diﬀerence with the Cournot competition model is that now firms
must be inspected with probability 1 to induce them to shift to the good
technology. This comes from the fact that when using the good technology,
profits are driven down to zero, so the only credible threat in expected terms
is to capture any positive profit for sure. Expressions for x∗, x∗∗ and x∗∗∗ can
be readily derived from equations (9) to (11), with π∗ = π∗∗ = 1, as x∗ =
∆c(qGn )
qGn
³
1 + τγλνk
´
, x∗∗ =
∆c(qGn )
qGn
(1 + νλ), and x∗∗∗ =
∆c(qGn )
qGn
³
1 + λν(1−τk)
(1−γ)
´
.
Obviously, the pattern of government intervention will depend on the
shape of the cost function. To represent this graphically, we first use the same
cost function as before (∆c (q) = βq). Note that in this case, the threshold
values are independent of n, which is due to the fact that
∆c(qGn )
qGn
= β. The
diﬀerent regimes22 are shown in figure 5, where the values for x∗, x∗∗ and
x∗∗∗ correspond to the asymptotic values in Figure 2.
22Again, the intermediate regime PC disappears for ξ lower than the threshold ξ∗ =
k−γ
k(1−γ) , which is now independent of n. We present the case in which ξ > ξ
∗.
23
xn
NI
PC
NC
x
β
NI
PC
NC
45o
(a) Relationship between x and β for n fixed.
(b) Shape of intervention for varying x and n (β fixed).
x*
x*
x**
x**
x***
x***
Figure 5: Bertrand competition
In this case, it is straightforward to see that a change in the number of
participating firms does not have any eﬀect on the range of parameters for
which corruption is allowed to happen. This result clearly derives from the
particularity of Bertrand competition, in which profits are zero whatever the
number of firms, and from the fact that both the unitary cost diﬀerential
between the two technology and the unitary externality are constant.
Consider now a strictly convex cost function23, c(q) = βq2. Thresholds
x∗ and x∗∗∗ become:
x∗ = βqn
µ
1 +
τ
γ
λνk
¶
(12)
23Considering a convex externality of the form x (Q) = xQz, with z > 1 would lead to
similar results.
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and
x∗∗∗ = βqn
µ
1 +
λν (1− τk)
(1− γ)
¶
. (13)
If qn is decreasing24 in n, these two thresholds are decreasing in the num-
ber of firms, yielding the pattern described in Figure 6.
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(a) Relationship between x and β for n fixed.
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Figure 6: Bertrand competition
Again, the region in which corruption happens shrinks as n grows, al-
though it does not completely disappears in the limit. This time, however,
24This is true if the Hahn-Novshek condition is met (a firm’s marginal revenue falls as the
output of all other firms rise), the inverse demand curve is downward-sloping and marginal
cost is non-decreasing (see Martin, 2002). This holds for example for a specification of
linear demand and constant marginal cost. Alternatively, if qn is increasing in n, we get a
pattern similar to the one in Figure 2.
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due to the convexity of the cost function, there is some cost saving related
to the fact that, as the number of firms grows, each one produces a smaller
individual output and faces a smaller unit cost of shifting to the good tech-
nology. Thus, there are “aggregate” decreasing returns to scale of the good
technology. The reduction in cost outweighs the additional incentive cost of
inspectors, so as n grows, it becomes valuable to send in inspectors for lower
level of the externality and the NI region becomes smaller.
Here also, the pattern of intervention for a given level of externality x
can show diﬀerent dynamics with respect to the occurrence of corruption.
Considering an externality characterized by a unitary cost x4, we obtain the
same comparative statics as in Figure 3, with corruption disappearing for
n > n4. However, for an externality with a lower unitary cost, such as x3,
these are completely reversed, with no corruption initially, and the jump to
a regime in which corruption actually happens when the number of firms
increases, as in Figure 4.
The intuition is now slightly diﬀerent. As the number of firms grows, the
sum of the cost of shifting to the good technology (remember that each one
produces a smaller individual output and thus faces a smaller unit cost) and
the incentive payments decreases in n and eventually becomes smaller than
the externality cost, making it socially eﬃcient to shift from no inspections
to a regime with some inspections. However, the potential gain is not high
enough to justify the waste of incentive payments that inspections without
any corruption entail, so partial corruption is tolerated.
6 Conclusion
We have developed a model in which firms compete in the market for an
homogenous good. Regulatory intervention to correct a negative externality
linked to the production process, and the reliance on heterogeneous inspec-
tors to determine the type of technology used by firms may generate some
corruption in equilibrium. For specific values of the externality that mo-
tivate the regulatory intervention, we provide evidence of non-monotonic
eﬀects, implying that in specific environments more competition can either
lead to an increase or a decrease in corruption. Moreover, we show that more
competition is welfare enhancing regardless of its eﬀects on corruption. The
main insights of the model hold both in the context of Cournot and Bertrand
competition.
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One of the main aspect that we have left for future research is the intro-
duction in this setting of a link between potential or realized corruption and
competition, thus endogenizing the degree of competition as well. As sug-
gested by Bliss and Di Tella (1997), corrupt agents may adjust their behavior
taking into account the fact that their bribe demands aﬀect firms’ decision
to enter or exit the market, thus making the degree of competition, and the
associated rents, endogenous. Combining this feature with our endogenous
corruption setting is certainly promising. This would open the possibility to
analyze the dynamic eﬀects of policy interventions, for example those aﬀect-
ing barriers to entry in certain industries or specific crack-down on corruption,
and clarify the conditions in which such policies may be successful.
Finally, additional theoretical aspects to be considered include the fact
that the organizational structure in which corrupt agents evolve and the
interactions between them also influence the level of corruption that prevails
(Rose-Ackerman, 1999, Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Competition between
bureaucrats is an issue that certainly deserves further research.
At the empirical level, it would be interesting to obtain microeconomic
data and disentangle the incentive eﬀects discussed earlier. While exist-
ing studies argue, on the basis of cross-country or inter-industry compar-
isons, for a link between more competition and less corruption, it is unclear
whether policy interventions inducing limited shifts in the degree of compe-
tition within specific industries or sectors would have the same unambiguous
results.
7 Appendix
7.1 Derivation of the Thresholds in Section 3.
Recall the expressions for social welfare with no intervention (NI), interven-
tion and partial corruption (PC) and intervention and no corruption (NC)
respectively:
WNI = CS
¡
QGn
¢
+ nΠBn
¡
qGn
¢
− xQGn ,
WPC = CS(QGn ) + (1− γ)π∗∗nΠBn
¡
QGn
¢
+ (1− (1− γ)π∗∗)nΠGn
−x (1− γ)π∗∗QGn − (γ + (1− γ)ξ)nπ∗∗λνks,
WNC = CS(QGn ) + nΠGn − nπ∗νλs.
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For the ease of comparisons, we can rewrite these expressions as:
WNI = CS
¡
QGn
¢
+ n
¡
p(QGn ).q
G
n − ci
¡
qGn
¢¢
− xQGn ,
WPC = CS(QGn ) + n
¡
p(QGn ).q
G
n − ci
¡
qGn
¢¢
− (1− (1− γ)π∗∗)n∆c
¡
qGn
¢
−x (1− γ)π∗∗QGn − τnπ∗∗λνks,
WNC = CS(QGn ) + n
¡
p(QGn ).q
G
n − ci
¡
qGn
¢¢
− nπ∗νλs.
where τ ≡ (γ + (1− γ)ξ) . It is then easy to check that WPC > WNI is
equivalent to:
xQGn > (1− (1− γ)π∗∗)n∆c
¡
qGn
¢
+ x (1− γ)π∗∗QGn + γnπ∗∗λνks
⇔ x (1− (1− γ)π∗∗)QGn > (1− (1− γ)π∗∗)n∆c
¡
qGn
¢
+ γnπ∗∗λνks
⇔ x >
∆c
¡
qGn
¢
qGn
µ
1 +
τπ∗∗λνk
1− (1− γ)π∗∗
¶
≡ x∗,
where we make use of the fact that s = ∆c
¡
qGn
¢
.
WNC > WNI entails:
xQGn > n∆c
¡
qGn
¢
+ nπ∗λνs⇔ xQGn > n∆c
¡
qGn
¢
(1 + π∗λν)
⇔ x >
∆c
¡
qGn
¢
qGn
(1 + π∗λν) ≡ x∗∗
Similarly, the condition for WNC > WPC is given by:
n
¡
p(QGn ).q
G
n − ci
¡
qGn
¢¢
− nπ∗νλs > n
¡
p(QGn ).q
G
n − ci
¡
qGn
¢¢
− (1− (1− γ)π∗∗)n∆c
¡
qGn
¢
− x (1− γ)π∗∗QGn − γnπ∗∗λνks.
This is equivalent to:
x (1− γ)π∗∗QGn >
(π∗ − γkπ∗∗)nλνs+ n∆c
¡
qGn
¢
− (1− (1− γ)π∗∗)n∆c
¡
qGn
¢
,
which after some transformation, and using again s = ∆c
¡
qGn
¢
, gives:
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x >
∆c
¡
qGn
¢
qGn
µ
1 +
λν (π∗ − τkπ∗∗)
(1− γ)π∗∗
¶
≡ x∗∗∗.
It can be checked that in order for x∗∗ > x∗ and x∗∗∗ > x∗∗ to hold, both
inequality require that:
π∗
π∗∗
− τk > π∗(1− γ)
Using expressions (4) and (5) in the text, this inequality becomes (γ+ξ(1−γ))Π
G
n+s
ΠGn+s
−
τk > (1− γ) sΠGn+s .
After some transformation, this gives (γ(1− k)− (1− γ)(1− ξ)k)
¡
ΠGn + s
¢
+
ξ(1 − γ)ΠGn > 0. This is equivalent to say that there is a threshold ξ∗ =
k−γ
1−γ
ΠGn+s
(1+k)ΠGn+ks
such that for ξ > ξ∗, we have the ordering x∗ < x∗∗ < x∗∗∗.
Alternatively, for ξ ≤ ξ∗, we get x∗∗∗ < x∗∗ < x∗.
7.2 Graphical Representation of cases 1 and 2, Corol-
lary 2.
Figures 7 and 8 show the shape of the diﬀerent regions and the main compar-
ative statics in the space (x, n) for β fixed, using the diﬀerential cost function
∆c (q) = βq.
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7.3 Comparative Statics for π∗ and π∗∗ in Figure 2.
Using the functional form in the text (∆c (q) = βq), we can rewrite π∗ and
π∗∗ as;
π∗ =
s
ΠGn + s
=
βqGn
pGn q
G
n − βqGn + βqGn
=
β
pGn
,
and
π∗∗ =
s
(γ + ξ(1− γ))ΠGn + s
=
βqGn
(γ + ξ(1− γ)) pGn qGn − (γ + ξ(1− γ)) βqGn + βqGn
=
β
(γ + ξ(1− γ)) pGn + (1− (γ + ξ(1− γ)))β
.
As pGn is decreasing in n, it comes that both π
∗ and π∗∗are increasing in
n.
Moreover, note that π
∗
π∗∗ can be rewritten as:
π∗
π∗∗
=
(γ + ξ(1− γ)) pGn + (1− (γ + ξ(1− γ)))β
pGn
= (γ + ξ(1− γ)) + (1− (γ + ξ(1− γ))) β
pGn
,
which is again increasing in n.
7.4 Comparative Statics on Bribes
Consider the region of parameters [x∗, x∗∗∗] in which corruption actually hap-
pens. Then as n, the number of firms operating in the market, increases, the
size of aggregate bribes is given by:
S = (1− γ)π∗∗ns = (1− γ)π∗∗n∆c
¡
qGn
¢
,
which can be written as:
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S = (1− γ) β
(γ + ξ(1− γ)) pGn + (1− (γ + ξ(1− γ)))β
nβqGn .
Using the values pGn = β +
1−β
n+1 and q
G
n =
1−β
n+1 , we get after some compu-
tations:
S =
(1− γ) (1− β)β2
β n+1n + (γ + ξ(1− γ))
1−β
n
,
so that ∂S∂n > 0.
Finally, it is easily shown that S is constant in the case of Bertrand
competition.
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